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CORNEA AND CLOSURE
Andrew Graham and Stephen Maitzen

Could our observations of apparently pointless evil ever justify the conclusion that God does not exist? Not according to Stephen Wykstra, who several
years ago announced the “Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access,” or
“CORNEA,” a principle that has sustained critiques of atheistic arguments
from evil ever since. Despite numerous criticisms aimed at CORNEA in recent
years, the principle continues to be invoked and defended. We raise a new
objection: CORNEA is false because it entails intolerable violations of closure.

Could our observations of apparently pointless evil ever justify the conclusion that God does not exist? Not according to Stephen Wykstra, who
several years ago announced the “Condition of Reasonable Epistemic
Access,” or “CORNEA,” a principle that has sustained critiques of atheistic arguments from evil ever since.1 Despite numerous criticisms aimed
at CORNEA in recent years, the principle continues to be invoked and
defended.2 We raise a new objection: CORNEA is false because it entails
intolerable violations of closure.
Wykstra oﬀers CORNEA as a necessary condition for one’s being
entitled to assert claims of the form “It appears that p.” He seeks to
retain the virtues of Richard Swinburne’s account of “the ‘seems so, is so’
presumption” while rejecting what he regards as Swinburne’s arbitrary
distinction between “positive” and “negative” seemings, a distinction he
derides as “Swinburne’s Slip”: “Since the distinction between positive and
negative seemings depends so much upon formulation, it is hard to see
how it can have the epistemic bite Swinburne gives it.”3 His alternative,
CORNEA, runs as follows:
On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim “It
appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her
cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not
the case, s would likely be diﬀerent than it is in some way discernible
by her.4
According to Wykstra, CORNEA applies to the “epistemic” sense of
“appears” rather than to the merely phenomenal sense of the word; in
the epistemic sense of “It appears that p,” he writes, “I take there to be an
evidential connection between what I am inclined to believe (namely, that
p) and the cognized situation that inclines me to believe it.”5 He concludes
that atheistic arguments containing premisses of the form “It appears
that such-and-such evil is pointless” (such William L. Rowe’s well-known
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argument from evil) cannot even get started, since CORNEA prevents any
human being from properly asserting even the apparent pointlessness of
any instance of evil. Why? Because, says Wykstra, the purposes of an omniscient God, if there is one, in permitting evil probably fall outside our
limited ken; thus it is not reasonable for any of us to believe that we would
always see the point of God’s permitting evil even if it always had a point.
Granted, the agonizing and terminal suﬀering of a fawn burned in a remote forest fire6 may seem to serve no greater good, but it would seem that
way to us even if it served a greater good that we are too ignorant to detect.
So, on CORNEA, we have no business saying it appears to be pointless, in
the epistemic sense of “appears,” and without even apparently pointless
evil to invoke, standard evidential arguments from evil founder.
Critics have raised various objections to CORNEA, but none, as far as
we know, have focused adequately on the subjunctive conditional clause
in Wykstra’s principle: “if p were not the case, s would likely be diﬀerent
than it is in some way discernible by [H].” This clause closely resembles
the well-known subjunctive “sensitivity” condition on knowledge7 championed by Dretske and Nozick, and its presence in CORNEA therefore
poses a familiar problem: satisfaction of CORNEA will fail to be closed
under known implication. For instance, a subject H can satisfy CORNEA
for “It appears to H that (p & q)” while failing to satisfy CORNEA for “It
appears to H that p,” even when H knows, as H typically will, that (p & q)
implies p. CORNEA thus violates closure, a defect many regard as fatal for
those analyses of knowledge on which knowledge must be sensitive.
Let “R” denote the proposition that you are an embodied person who
is reading right now, and let “BIV” denote the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis,
according to which you have recently and unknowingly become a disembodied brain-in-a-vat being electrochemically fed exactly the experiences
you are now having. BIV is deliberately designed to make its truth indistinguishable, by you, from its falsity. Presumably, you now satisfy CORNEA
for asserting
(1) It appears that (R & ~BIV),
because if (R & ~BIV) were false, R would be the only false conjunct, and
you would discern its falsity: in the closest possible worlds in which (R
& ~BIV), you are an embodied person whose experiences make you aware
that you are doing something other than reading right now (maybe you’ve
just put aside this essay). Hence it is reasonable for you to believe that,
given your cognitive faculties and the use you have made of them, if (R &
~BIV) were not the case, things would look diﬀerent to you from the way
they now look. However, while you satisfy CORNEA for (1) and also for
(2) It appears that R
(since, as before, if R were not the case, things would look diﬀerent to
you), you fail CORNEA for
(3) It appears that ~BIV.
Again, BIV stipulates that you cannot perceptually distinguish worlds
where you are a brain-in-a-vat from worlds where you are normally
embodied. Apprised of this stipulation, you cannot reasonably believe that,
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given your cognitive faculties and the use you have made of them, if BIV
were the case then your “cognized situation . . . would likely be diﬀerent
than it is in some way discernible by [you].”
Thus you satisfy CORNEA for asserting a conjunction even when one
of its conjuncts does not—indeed, cannot—epistemically appear to you
to be true. This result is bad enough by itself, especially in light of the
evidential sense of “appears” that Wykstra invokes: how could your total
evidence support a conjunction while failing to support one of its conjuncts? How could you be evidentially better-oﬀ with respect to (p & q)
than you are with respect to p?8 But this particular defect betokens a quite
general failure of closure. Every rational person who understands the relevant concepts knows, at least tacitly, that a conjunction implies each of its
conjuncts; thus satisfaction of CORNEA violates closure not just under
implication but also under known implication: you satisfy CORNEA for
“It appears that (p & q)” while necessarily failing it for “It appears that q”
even though you know that (p & q) implies q.
Similarly implausible results are not far to find. While you satisfy CORNEA for “It appears that R,” you cannot satisfy CORNEA for “It appears
that I am not mistaken in now judging that R,” since it is not reasonable
for you to believe the following: “Were I mistaken in now judging that R,
things would look diﬀerent to me.” On the contrary, if you were mistaken
in that occurrent judgment, your mistake would arise from a cognitive
situation relevantly like the one you are now having, namely, one causing you now to judge that R.9 In general, you can satisfy CORNEA for
asserting “It appears that p” even when you fail the condition for asserting “It appears that I am not mistaken in now judging that p,” a damning
result given that “p” obviously implies the wide-scope negation “I am not
mistaken in now judging that p.” Nor, finally, can Wykstra exploit the difference (if there is a principled diﬀerence) between the “positive” appearance-claim “It appears that p” and the “negative” appearance-claim “It
appears that I am not mistaken in now judging that p” without by his own
lights committing Swinburne’s Slip.
One might respond by emphasizing that CORNEA is only a necessary
condition, not a suﬃcient condition, for being entitled to assert appearanceclaims: being so entitled may require the fulfillment of further conditions
as well. But our argument never assumes otherwise. We need not assume
that CORNEA by itself entitles you to assert “It appears that (p & q)” while
it precludes your asserting “It appears that p,” for some p and q. Nor need
we assume that CORNEA by itself entitles you to assert “It appears that p”
while it precludes your asserting “It appears that q” for some q you know
is implied by p. In its present form, CORNEA certainly does nothing to
discourage those two assumptions, but it does not imply them either.10 Instead, we urge the rejection of any evidential test which (i) you can pass for
a conjunction while failing—indeed, necessarily failing—for one conjunct
and (ii) you can pass for p while (necessarily) failing for some q you know
to be implied by p. CORNEA is such a test. If atheistic arguments from evil
fail, it is not because they violate Wykstra’s false constraint on the assertion
of appearance-claims. Alas, a sensitive CORNEA is a major disability.
Acadia University
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1. See Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Evil: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’,” International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), pp. 73–93. Wykstra’s original target is William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American
Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp. 335–41.
2. Critical treatments include Keith Chrzan, “Debunking CORNEA,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987), pp. 171–77; Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Seeing Through CORNEA,” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 32 (1992), pp. 25–49; and Jim Stone, “Evidential Atheism,” Philosophical Studies 114 (2003), pp. 253–77. For further invocation and defense of CORNEA, see Bruce Russell and Stephen Wykstra, “The ‘Inductive’ Argument
from Evil: A Dialogue,” Philosophical Topics 16 (1988), pp. 133–60; Stephen John
Wykstra, “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,” The Evidential Argument
from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1996), pp. 126–50; and Stephen Wykstra, “Stone-Ground CORNEA: A Rebuttal,” presented at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical
Association, 24 April 2004.
3. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle,” pp. 83, 84.
4. Ibid., p. 85.
5. Ibid., p. 87.
6. See Rowe, “The Problem of Evil,” p. 337.
7. According to the sensitivity condition, roughly, you know that p only
if you would not believe that p if it were false that p.
8. This point is not to be confused with the harmless Bayesian result, apparently overlooked by Stone (“Evidential Atheism,” p. 264), that a given piece
of evidence can increase the probability of a conjunction without increasing the
probability of each of its conjuncts and even while decreasing the probability
of each of its conjuncts. We thank David Anderson for drawing our attention
to the latter result.
9. In the closest possible worlds in which you genuinely but mistakenly
now judge that you are reading (these worlds need not be close tout court),
you are, say, dreaming or hallucinating that you are reading, and the illusion
is evidently good enough to fool you. In claiming that you now judge that R,
we presume that our merely broaching the topic suﬃces to induce in you that
occurrent judgment.
10. Wykstra himself sometimes leaves the impression, presumably unintended, that satisfying CORNEA is suﬃcient for legitimately asserting appearance-claims: “Seeing no elephant in a normal room, after looking hard,
gives us good reason to believe no elephant is in the room” (Russell and Wykstra, “A
Dialogue,” p. 143, emphasis added); “Looking around my garage and seeing
no dog entitles me to conclude that none is present, but seeing no fleas does not.”
(Wykstra, “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments,” p. 126, emphasis added).

